Philipp Maier offers an examination of the extent to which governments and various interest groups have exerted pressure on central banks. The book looks in particular at the Deutsche Bundesbank - which acted as the blueprint for the European Central Bank (ECB) - and utilizes an original set of indicators to measure external pressure and support from the government and other institutions. The author demonstrates that although some of the rhetoric of the Bundesbank may have been a response to political pressure, the operation and conduct of German monetary policy has not been influenced. The role of various pressure groups remains a more contentious issue, as there is evidence that the Bundesbank may have acted to appease the financial sector. The author also finds that a high degree of public support towards the Bundesbank has helped to mitigate the effect of external forces. As the ECB was closely modelled on its German counterpart, the author is able to extend his analysis to the European level and draw out explicit predictions for the ECB. He argues that external pressure is unlikely to influence the conduct of monetary policy, as it will be less efficient and organized, and public support is likely to be high. In the future, however, this could be jeopardized by a rapid enlargement of EMU which may result in more concentrated and powerful pressure groups. Table of Contents Review of the literature political pressure in OECD countries before elections the rhetoric of central banks a new indicator for (political) pressure the role of public support the European context - an economic analysis the European context - a political assessment the impact of EMU enlargement conclusion A - Germany's institutional setting B - the refined "corridor" for the standard deviation C - data sources.