

## CONTENTS

	<i>Illustrations</i>	ix
	<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xiii
	<i>Abbreviations</i>	xvii
1	Introduction	1
2	Political Stage, Actors, and Audience	15
3	Violent-Victors Theory of Political Behavior after War	25
4	Postwar Voters and Survey Experiments	63
5	Military Draw in El Salvador	110
6	Government Victory in Guatemala	158
7	Rebel Victory in Nicaragua	194
8	Political Life after War Globally, 1970–2015	210
9	Implications for Postwar Peace, Justice, Democracy, and Governance	240
10	Conclusion	253
	<i>Appendix</i>	263
	<i>Notes</i>	277
	<i>References</i>	331
	<i>Index</i>	369

# 1

## Introduction

### Puzzle: Why Do Bloodstained Parties Win Postwar Elections?

In Guatemala, Efraín Ríos Montt, a “merciless” and “born-again butcher,”<sup>1</sup> led the country’s armed forces as they perpetrated 86,000 murders and 90 percent of the civil war’s widespread atrocities.<sup>2</sup> After the war ended, Ríos Montt’s party, the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), competed in the 1999 presidential and legislative elections that founded the country’s postwar political order. U.S. expectations of the outcome are revealed in declassified U.S. diplomatic cables: “An [electoral] victory of Rios would prove very difficult given his reputation as a major human rights violator.”<sup>3</sup> The Truth Commissions had publicized the facts of the brutality; a genocide case had been filed against Ríos Montt. And yet Ríos Montt’s FRG party won in elections seen as “free and fair,”<sup>4</sup> defeating a competitive opposition party that was untainted by the bloody past. Ríos Montt himself became president of Congress. FRG won a majority in every province, even, astoundingly, in the indigenous zones that had suffered the most from Ríos Montt’s scorched-earth tactics. “Witnesses to and even survivors of the massacres that had taken place under his administration”<sup>5</sup>—an estimated 47 percent of victims<sup>6</sup>—voted for the executioner-turned-democrat.<sup>7</sup>

Similarly in El Salvador in 1994, the ARENA party,<sup>8</sup> the “aboveground alter ego of the notorious ‘death squad’ networks,”<sup>9</sup> won free democratic elections,<sup>10</sup> besting the far less violent FMLN<sup>11</sup> rebel party and an opposition party unimplicated in the country’s carnage.<sup>12</sup> Although the death squads had been responsible, with the armed forces, for 95 percent of the war’s 70,000 political killings, ARENA secured the votes of 40 percent of victims, including 40 percent of displaced victims.<sup>13</sup> Votes for ARENA were collected even in

areas most brutalized by state violence, in elections widely seen as “orderly, peaceful, and transparent . . . which permitted the popular will of the Salvadoran people to be expressed . . . without fear of violent incidents.”<sup>14</sup>

In Colombia, the party of President Álvaro Uribe, who faced hundreds of investigations for ties to illegal paramilitaries, and a spree of extrajudicial killings labeled “one of the worst episodes of mass atrocity in the Western Hemisphere in recent decades,”<sup>15</sup> also won multiparty postwar democratic elections. After the paramilitary armies had demobilized, politicians linked to them won a third of the country’s congressional seats and hundreds of local elected offices. Even in places terrorized by paramilitary massacres, assassinations, and disappearances,<sup>16</sup> where citizens historically had backed the guerrillas, 88 percent of the population deemed the presence of the paramilitaries positive and 41 percent viewed the ex-paramilitaries as protectors.<sup>17</sup> “Being a paramilitary victim or non-victim [was] not a characteristic that [could] determine if the [paramilitary politicians would] win more or less support,”<sup>18</sup> in an environment in which “everyone [knew] . . . [which politicians had] paramilitary connections.”<sup>19</sup>

How could this happen? Yet these cases are not aberrations. Around the world, after episodes of mass political violence in war, citizens choose who will govern their countries in posttransition elections that are critical to peace, justice, democracy, and governance. In these elections, astonishingly large numbers of citizens vote for political parties that have deep roots in the blood-stained organizations of the past, even those most guilty of heinous atrocities. These belligerent successors often outperform nonbelligerent parties and win clean elections; they attract votes not only from their core supporters but also from swing voters and even from the victims of their wartime violence.

The electoral successes of bloodstained parties cannot be understood with conventional explanations. Across postwar elections globally, parties that proved electorally successful were not those that had been more restrained in their wartime violence; the votes they won came not just from people who were their beneficiaries or at least not victims of their transgressions.<sup>20</sup> Instead, belligerents that committed high levels of wartime brutality and that won militarily performed well in the elections; they performed just as well as war victors that had refrained from extensive atrocities. Votes for belligerents’ successor parties in regions that had been terrorized were comparable to votes in regions left unscathed by the belligerents’ wartime campaigns. Victims themselves voted as often for their perpetrators as for parties unstained by war.

This cannot be explained by the fog of war, or that voters did not know what had happened during wartime. While this fog was still lifting, in many places

elections followed widely publicized reports of truth commissions, so voters could well have known whom to blame for the violence before casting their votes. It also cannot be explained by an argument that these belligerent successor parties won only coerced votes<sup>21</sup> in nondemocratic elections, or only agreed to elections they believed they could win.<sup>22</sup> They also won abundant freely cast votes in postwar elections, widely seen as free and fair, and held in the aftermath of nearly every armed conflict.<sup>23</sup> Although alternative explanations based in well-established determinants of political behavior, such as economic voting, clientelism, and partisanship,<sup>24</sup> can account for partial patterns of the elections, they leave significant variation in political life after war unexplained.

This book illuminates that critical unexplained share of the vote delivered to bloodstained wartime belligerents by looking to the experiences, outcomes, and legacies of significant violence in war. Using the tools of political behavior, it joins an important body of international relations scholarship that leverages these tools to understand public opinion toward the use of force and to explain the electoral drivers and consequences of security in its international and domestic manifestations.<sup>25</sup>

## The Argument in Brief: Violent Victors Secure the Future

Why do parties that have engaged in violent atrocities in civil war perform well in postwar democratic elections? How do parties guilty of violence against the civilian population seek that population's votes? Why would a victimized population elect its tormentors to govern it? This book develops a counterintuitive answer: these bloodstained parties, if victorious in war, successfully present themselves as the most credible providers of social peace.

War outcomes, then, can tell us what to expect of the electoral prospects of militarily belligerent successor parties. Belligerents' electoral opponents might seem to have an advantage: parties without roots in the violent organizations of the war can claim a cleaner human rights record and show themselves in a positive light compared to the successors of belligerent transgressors. Their civilian elites assert that they can oblige the government to control itself, and this claim is made more credible by their record of abiding by the rules designed to protect the population's civil liberties.<sup>26</sup>

The victorious or stalemated belligerent must counter the attention to its dismal human rights record that would raise doubt about its ability to control its use of coercive power against the population. A winner in war earns and

may deploy a potent electoral weapon: credit for ceasing the wartime violence. To adroitly play the strategic game of postwar politics, it may leverage this weapon in order to alter how voters judge the past and predict the future.<sup>27</sup> Specifically, it may seek electoral rewards for not inflicting continued war against the population and for instead ending the population's suffering and giving it the security of peace. Such credit for war termination may lend it a cloak of immunity under which a bloodstained party's record of coercion becomes not an electoral liability but an asset, bolstering its reputation for competence on security. It can argue that its record uniquely positions it to provide sustained stability: that it alone is powerful enough to "overawe" others who might threaten disorder,<sup>28</sup> and thus that it alone can "enable the government to control the governed."<sup>29</sup> To counter valid suspicions that it could use its power to repeat its past offenses, it makes a show of purging rights abusers from its ranks, but not the strongman who exemplifies its security credentials. It also moderates programmatically and promises to serve and protect the broader electorate as its constituency.

Both the nonbelligerent and belligerent parties seek to harness the power of media to propagate their respective messages and persuade the citizenry of their claims to restrained protection, a valence issue for voters. These voters, battered by a "war of all against all," crave security—particularly those who are victims, direct and indirect, of the conflict's violence. They weigh which party they can trust to handle the tasks of securing their future. As the establishment of political order from war is decided through elections, these voters wrestle with the foundational questions of human collective life: who can seek to establish the "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force"?<sup>30</sup> Who is best at wielding coercion to curb societal violence?

In this dilemma, I argue, voters are more persuaded by the victorious combatant party than by less violent belligerents that lost the war, or by nonbelligerents who are untainted by war.<sup>31</sup> They reward the war winner for the stability of peace, rather than punishing it for the atrocity of war. As a result, they deem the war winner better able than its less tainted rivals to preserve societal order going forward. A Madisonian variant of Hobbes wins out and core, swing, and even victim voters elect what I call "Restrained Leviathans" to govern them.<sup>32</sup>

The electoral performance of the heir to the militarily vanquished belligerent, meanwhile, is constrained by its inferior war outcome, and such a party generally makes a poor showing in the election: it is blamed for past violence, while it lacks credibility as a provider of future security. If, however, it

apologizes for its transgressions and advances a nonmainstream, nonsecurity platform, it might earn a small foothold in postwar politics and a reputation that can help it in future elections.

I test this explanation for the electoral success of violent victors with a rich empirical design, combining extensive fieldwork; individual-level experimental data from an original survey in Colombia; party-level archival evidence from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua; and cross-national evidence from data on all 205 belligerent parties around the world that transitioned from war between 1970 and 2015.

## Implications for Peace, Democracy, Justice, and Governance

This book explains why people vote for the very political actors guilty of violence against the civilian population. It argues that war outcomes influence the results of founding postwar elections by guiding party strategy and voter behavior. The selection of bloodstained parties in these pivotal elections is highly consequential for fundamental questions of postwar peace and war recurrence, democracy and political development, justice and reconciliation, the rule of law, and public goods provision. In such postwar elections, voters tend to opt for an end to armed conflict, but at the price of justice, liberalism, and welfare.

### *War and Peace*

The elections at the center of this book constitute a linchpin in theories of whether war resumes or peace consolidates. Scholars herald such elections as conducive to sustained conflict termination by establishing institutionalized channels for opposition, which tend to dampen subsequent violent conflicts and limit social unrest.<sup>33</sup> An open political system and access to political participation have been found to inoculate a society against a return to civil conflict,<sup>34</sup> and to bestow legitimacy upon the postwar political order. Allowing ballots should diminish any resort to bullets.<sup>35</sup>

At the same time, the advent of elections in postwar societies also brings risk.<sup>36</sup> There is concern, specifically, that, as Dawn Brancati and Jack Snyder warn, electoral “losers will refuse to accept the results peacefully”<sup>37</sup> and return to war.<sup>38</sup> This concern has motivated a robust body of scholarship aimed at determining how to harness the benefits of democracy for peace while

mitigating democracy's perils; among the proposed tools are inclusive elections (with provisions for rebel participation),<sup>39</sup> delaying the elections,<sup>40</sup> deploying international election monitors,<sup>41</sup> and institutionalizing power sharing.<sup>42</sup>

The book departs from this pioneering scholarship by focusing not on such structural features of the pivotal founding elections but instead on their results. In so doing, it opens the black box of the elections themselves and illuminates the relationship between how well belligerents perform in the elections and the decision to remilitarize.

The book's argument implies that postwar elections, in and of themselves, are not likely to lead to a return to violence. Instead, such elections should be stabilizing if the balance of military power remains constant after war.<sup>43</sup> The prevalence of security voting gives war victors the upper hand in the elections, and these victorious belligerent parties emerge as the most capable of both suppressing their own violence and deterring their opponents—the losers—from remilitarizing. With an unaltered distribution of military power after war, there exists little reason for either the war winner or war loser to reinitiate violence; the election results reflect this underlying power balance, and a new war would be unlikely to yield a different outcome.<sup>44</sup> “Negative peace”<sup>45</sup> should thus hold. Such stability, in turn, facilitates economic recovery.<sup>46</sup>

However, if the balance of power instead inverts after war's end and if the electorate, using the heuristic of war outcomes to guide their votes, chooses the now weaker war winner, electoral results become misaligned with military power and the newly empowered war loser has electoral incentives to return to war. This is because the strong correlation between war outcomes and electoral performance in the first postwar political contest creates perverse incentives for belligerents: a return to war becomes beneficial rather than costly for a newly strengthened war loser.<sup>47</sup> This belligerent may reinitiate fighting to take advantage of the power change, hoping to try its hand at the polls again in the future from a position of a superior war outcome. The founding selection of bloodstained parties therefore has critical implications for whether war recurs or peace sustains.

### *Democracy*

The war-to-peace transitions that are central to this book also strongly influence the prospects for democracy. Studies by Elisabeth Jean Wood, Virginia Page Fortna, and Reyko Huang tell when to anticipate democratization to

emerge from war.<sup>48</sup> The work of Thomas Flores and Irfan Nooruddin, Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, Aila Matanock, and Leonard Wantchekon underscores the fragility of such democratic elections where there is a history of violent conflict.<sup>49</sup>

This book's examination and explanation of why and how bloodstained parties perform well in postwar elections offer vital answers to questions of democratization. Adapting the logic of Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John Stephens, the book suggests that such election results, although perhaps surprising, may actually facilitate democratic stability because "those who have only to gain from democracy"—here, war-winning belligerent parties well positioned to succeed in elections—"will be its most reliable promoters and defenders."<sup>50</sup>

Many such parties born in the ashes of war prove durable, particularly if they are able to respond as voters' more diverse nonsecurity concerns proliferate and if the parties are able to cultivate political machines to mobilize voters and distribute patronage. War and revolutionary uprisings consolidated many of the world's strong parties.<sup>51</sup> Election to office in the founding elections may thereby transform these parties into stable democratic actors, cementing the political party system around them.<sup>52</sup> (Indeed, the book reveals significant path dependency for political development triggered by the critical juncture of the founding electoral contests). At the same time, like former autocrats following negotiated democratic transitions,<sup>53</sup> these belligerent participants, while often sustaining a minimalist version of democracy, tend not to advance a more liberal variant.<sup>54</sup> At times, they cause or allow later democratic backsliding.<sup>55</sup>

### *Justice*

Postwar elections are the book's centerpiece. They reflect a critical tension between the goal of sustaining the termination of violence and the goal of holding the perpetrators of rights violations legally accountable. What is necessary electorally to avert instability and recurrent war may also protect human rights abusers. By enshrining amnesties, the elections may prevent countries from effectively closing the books on their nightmare pasts.<sup>56</sup>

This implication of the book joins the "peace-versus-justice" debate among scholars and practitioners of international transitional justice.<sup>57</sup> At the macro level, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink advance a "logic of appropriateness," arguing that there is a moral and legal imperative to hold perpetrators



swiftly to account criminally.<sup>58</sup> By this logic, security is the fruit of justice.<sup>59</sup> This “prosecute and punish” solution to what Samuel Huntington called the “torturer problem”<sup>60</sup> is echoed in micro-level studies of transitional justice across generations, which find, time after time, that descendants of victims seek political retribution against their perpetrators.<sup>61</sup>

On the other side of the debate, Monika Nalepa, Jack Snyder, and Leslie Vinjamuri advance a “logic of consequences,” whereby possibilities for legal accountability are constrained as a practical matter by power balances, self-interest, and feasibility.<sup>62</sup> By this logic, justice is the fruit of security.<sup>63</sup> This accords with the realist tradition that identifies systems of norms and justice as the products of power politics and argues that great powers determine the standards of morality that best suit their interests. So, too, in the domestic arena, powerful political players lock in the legal regimes that best protect their own interests.<sup>64</sup>

The argument that peace and order constitute preconditions for justice, rather than the other way around, finds robust support in the micro-level literature on transitional justice in the immediate aftermath of war. Surveys conducted in diverse environments around the world show that victims do not primarily seek truth, punishment, and reparations; rather, they pursue security first, under which they can get on with their lives, disregard the past, and focus on other concerns such as power and jobs.<sup>65</sup>

In line with the latter approach, the implication of this book’s argument is that, by voting perpetrators of atrocities into office, citizens reward rather than punish the past violence of the winning side. Armed with legitimate political power, the former abusers may engage in regressive justice and lock in their impunity, at least in the short to medium term. Their whitewashing of the violent past in their rhetoric and official historiography leaves a lasting scar by distorting national memory and the pursuit of truth. However, as peace consolidates, citizens gain breathing room from heightened insecurity and possibilities for justice may increase.<sup>66</sup>

### *Governance*

The book’s theory of “violent victors” has implications for governance, particularly social welfare and security provision. It suggests that the citizenry is likely to gain in the near term in the domain in which the militarily successful belligerent has a comparative advantage, competence, and expertise, and that is the security domain. However, because the belligerent successor party

prioritizes law and order over other social and development expenditures, voters' electoral choices tend to lead to the sacrifice of social welfare. This is consistent with scholarship revealing how budget reallocation to defense cannibalizes spending on social services, degrading development outcomes.<sup>67</sup> It also aligns with research documenting the trade-off when ironfisted security policy has priority over alternative crime-reduction strategies, such as human capital enhancement, showing that, as a result, both rule of law and the provision of public goods degrade over time.<sup>68</sup>

In sum, the book's theory and findings about why and how violent victors win postwar elections have critical implications, previously understudied, for our understanding of war recurrence, democratization, justice, security, and welfare over both the short term and the long term.

## Security and Political Behavior

This book uses the analytical tools of political behavior to answer important questions in international relations about war and peace. It also demonstrates the value of bringing security issues at the core of international relations more centrally into the study of political behavior.

By building a theory of the electoral consequences of use of force in war, drawing upon the toolbox of political behavior, I join scholars including Joshua Kertzer, Jon Pevehouse, Mike Tomz, Jessica Weeks, Keren Yarhi-Milo, and Thomas Zeitoff, among others, who bring developments in domestic politics into the study of international relations and identify the significant electoral drivers and effects of security and defense policies.<sup>69</sup> A well-established literature illuminates the effects of war, belligerence, and casualties on domestic audiences and vote outcomes; it has focused predominantly on U.S. public opinion and electoral behavior surrounding America's international use of force.<sup>70</sup>

This book studies voter attitudes and behavior surrounding the use of force domestically in intrastate war. The importance of these attitudes and behavior to determining postwar political order has rendered elections a central focus of many international relations theories of conflict termination and recurrence, although, with few exceptions,<sup>71</sup> they leave the strategic interactions of parties and voters underexplored.<sup>72</sup> The study of political behavior helps shed new light on patterns of postwar peace and war.

The resulting argument is that war outcomes affect who will rule the country after civil conflict, through the process of parties vying to own the salient

security issue and voters choosing candidates, based on security grounds. By identifying the political legacies of different forms of conflict termination, the book adds to scholarship on how wars end.<sup>73</sup> In emphasizing how military outcomes influence public reaction to belligerence and atrocity, the book accords with the work of Alexander Downes, Richard Eichenberg, Peter Feaver, Christopher Gelpi, and Jason Reifler, and Daryl Press, Scott Sagan, and Benjamin Valentino; they find that citizens respond positively to the use of force when it achieves decisive victory,<sup>74</sup> battlefield success,<sup>75</sup> or military utility.<sup>76</sup> In emphasizing party strategies, the book aligns with the work of Matthew Baum and Tim Groeling, Adam Berinsky, Elizabeth Saunders, and John Zaller on how political framing,<sup>77</sup> issue ownership,<sup>78</sup> and top-down elite cues<sup>79</sup> mediate mass opinion toward and voting on security issues. The book thereby brings the electoral consequences of use of force and military success in intrastate wars into dialogue with the significant scholarship on the domestic politics of belligerence in interstate war and intervention. It also motivates a research agenda that integrates the two, which I spell out in the book's conclusion.

## Security Voting

By studying security with the repertoire of political behavior models, the book shows how these models can apply to noneconomic issues. In the canonical theory of democratic political behavior, voters “reward the [parties] for good times, punish [them] for bad.”<sup>80</sup> Voters' choices are also based on their predictions about the parties' management of salient issues in the future.<sup>81</sup>

Theories of political behavior acknowledge that nonmaterial variables factor into vote choice.<sup>82</sup> Ferejohn (1986) writes, “If the incumbent administration has been successful in promoting economic growth and avoiding major wars, it will tend to be rewarded at the polls.” Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2003) state that “election outcomes depend on the ‘fundamentals,’ especially peace and prosperity.” Despite this acknowledgment of the importance of security, the literature's emphasis on material assessments has led most to refer to its canonical voting logic as “economic voting theory.” This is largely because theories of electoral politics tend to concentrate on richer and more economically developed democracies, contexts that, in recent times, have not experienced widespread insecurity from full-scale international and civil wars, rampant crime, or brutal repression.

In lower- and middle-income democracies, economic voting is also manifested,<sup>83</sup> but insecurity is not rare, geographically or demographically isolated,

or distant. In fact, one and a half billion people face the threat of violence as armed conflicts ravage large swaths of the developing world. State-based armed conflicts, the focus of this book, have taken place in 157 places globally since World War II and have stolen the lives of sixteen million people.<sup>84</sup> Over forty million people across the globe have become forcibly displaced or refugees of intrastate war and violence; millions more have suffered extortion, captivity, torture, and sexual violence. With attention to interstate wars, terrorism, and organized crime as well, it becomes clear that security issues may be highly salient for many voters globally and therefore likely influence their political behavior.<sup>85</sup>

This book shows that well-studied frameworks of party and voter behavior have significant explanatory power under such conditions: how parties script their programs, recruit their elites, target their voters, and campaign when security issues are paramount and how, under these conditions, voters make their electoral choices. In so doing, the book joins research on the effects of other forms of insecurity on political behavior, including terrorism,<sup>86</sup> high-casualty interstate wars,<sup>87</sup> crime,<sup>88</sup> military service,<sup>89</sup> and international interventions.<sup>90</sup>

Its conclusions align with studies that find that both victims and nonvictims facing threats of disorder tend to place less importance on civil liberties and prove more willing to accept repressive measures and ironfisted strongmen.<sup>91</sup> By shedding light on why victimized populations elect tormentor victors to office, the book contributes to the study of a broader phenomenon of political behavior: why people in democracies vote for “bad guys,” people with known ties to violent criminals,<sup>92</sup> militias,<sup>93</sup> warlords,<sup>94</sup> and corruption.<sup>95</sup>

## Road Map: How This Book Is Organized

The book is organized in ten chapters. The first part of the book presents the building blocks of the argument and shows how they are assembled into an explanation for why bloodstained parties win postwar elections. Chapter 2 sets the political stage for the theory chapter by defining the backdrop of postwar democratic elections; the cast of characters, comprising nonbelligerent parties and rebel and government belligerent successors under various war outcomes; and the audience, conflict-affected populations for whom security is a highly salient issue. Chapter 3 presents the book’s theory of how war outcomes influence electoral performance through party strategies and voter behavior. It outlines how, against the backdrop of the war-to-peace transition, nonbelligerent,

war-winning, and war-losing parties devise their respective programs and platforms, reckon with the violent past, build and target their constituencies, and retain and recruit (or expel) members of their elites. It delineates how voters emerging from war evaluate parties' competencies and formulate their political attitudes and behavior, and as a result elect civil war tormentors as they seek to secure their future during the pivotal foundation of postwar political order. Chapter 3 concludes by laying out the observable implications derived from the theory and from alternative accounts and describing how each is evaluated in the book's subsequent empirical chapters (4–9).

Chapter 4 tests the book's individual-voter-level hypotheses with experimental evidence from an original survey of fifteen hundred victims and non-victims in Colombia. It evaluates whether war winners as candidates are able to shift voters' reference points so as to launder these candidates' violent pasts and to cultivate a reputation for security, while losing belligerents cannot. With a series of survey experiments, the chapter then evaluates the party strategy of what I call a Restrained Leviathan, comprising military and civilian candidates, a platform convergent on the interests of the moderate voter, and a focus on the security valence issue, and assesses whether such a strategy does, as predicted, prove more successful for the militarily advantaged belligerent. I examine whether the political strategy of what I call the Tactical Immoderate, comprising civilian candidates, an immoderate platform, and nonsecurity valence priorities, proves more successful for the militarily disadvantaged belligerent. The original survey also enables me to experimentally evaluate alternative mechanisms of voter coercion and voter ignorance. I use the observational survey data to assess the robustness of security voting in actual elections against other drivers of political behavior: economic voting, clientelism, and partisanship.

The survey findings reveal what types of strategies would likely be optimal for different types of parties. Based on more than two cumulative years of fieldwork in Colombia; 350 interviews with victimizers and victims, campaign strategists, and candidates; text analysis of party programs and more than half a million Twitter posts from politicians' feeds; and review of daily press coverage and actual voting results, I examine the specifics of the political campaigns in the 2018 Colombian elections to explore, briefly, whether the parties followed or diverged from these optimal strategies, why, and with which electoral implications.

From the theory's voter-level underpinnings, Chapters 5 to 7 turn to its party-level ones, examining them in the context of Central America, which

experienced the full range of war outcomes. Chapter 5 examines a military draw in El Salvador; Chapter 6, government victory in Guatemala; and Chapter 7, rebel victory in Nicaragua. To reconstruct how each party developed its strategy, I conducted in-depth interviews with former presidents, presidential candidates, campaign strategists, senators of all political colors, and military commanders. I collected and analyzed, both with natural language processing and with qualitative review, the parties' political platforms, speeches, campaign advertisements, and rhetoric from multiple archives of newspaper, radio, television, and campaign data. I identified the war background of the candidates of each (belligerent and nonbelligerent) party and reviewed declassified U.S. embassy cables on the electoral contests. Each chapter looks at the effects of the parties' strategies on public opinion and voting behavior, using survey data collected contemporaneously during the elections. I use these survey data, together with municipal-level election data, to evaluate alternative explanations based on victimization, coercion, ideology, and economic voting. In each of these three case studies, I consider the implications of the founding elections for peace, democracy, party stability, rule of law, and justice. While the survey evidence and case material of Chapters 4 to 7 support the theory's observable implications, they also confirm that the real world proves more complex than a few variables can describe.

Chapter 8 examines the phenomenon of violent actors who win votes on a global scale to understand the generalizability and limitations of the theory. It uses an original dataset, the Civil War Successor Party (CWSP) cross-national dataset, which encompasses the full universe of belligerents around the world that transitioned from civil war between 1970 and 2015. The dataset traces the postwar political trajectories of the civil war belligerents, identifies their successor parties, charts their electoral performance, and identifies their nonbelligerent opponents. It shows that, consistent with the theory of the rest of the book, parties with violent pasts tend to dominate the elections and that war outcomes are powerful predictors of belligerent party performance, irrespective of the belligerents' use of mass atrocities. If militarily winning, abusive belligerent parties perform well, even where elections are clean, free, and fair. The CWSP dataset also enables an evaluation of factors that might, in theory, confound the relationship between war outcomes and election results: incumbency status, popular support, mobilization capacity, provision of public goods, organizational cohesion, and financing.

Chapter 8 then turns from cross-national data to newly assembled subnational data on violence, war outcomes, and voting. It shows that successor

parties' vote shares remain relatively constant whether the belligerents were responsible for all or none of the atrocities at the local level, but that these vote shares track with whether the belligerents militarily won or lost the war locally. The chapter concludes by investigating whether and how the logic works in contexts where the framework's assumptions hold more loosely: where ethnicity is a dominant cleavage, security is not highly salient, victimization is bounded geographically or demographically, electorates are bifurcated by secession, or politics are centered on patronage rather than programs.

Chapter 9 explores the implications of elections of bloodstained parties for war recurrence, transitional justice, democracy, and governance. To do so, it uses new global data that reveal not only whether a conflict resumed but also, through belligerent-level coding, *who* reinitiated the fighting. It shows that postwar elections increase the chance of renewed war if there is an inversion or reversal of the military balance of power after war, and if the war loser has performed poorly in the elections. If, instead, relative military power remains stable, civil war actors are unlikely to remilitarize if they lose the elections. The chapter then combines the book's CWSP cross-national data with information on amnesties and liberal democracy in an analysis that suggests the tragic (even if potentially temporary) trade-offs between peace and justice, and between peace and liberalism. To probe governance implications of the elections of violence-tied actors, the chapter analyzes an original database of 784 paramilitary mayors, based on over 42,000 pages of Colombian Supreme Court sentencing documents, to compare the administrations of paramilitary mayors who barely won with those who barely lost the elections along dimensions of security and public goods outcomes. It shows that the election of belligerent politicians generated a reduction in common crime but had pernicious effects on the provision of other public goods. The politicians' prioritization of security crowded out resources for social welfare.

The book concludes in Chapter 10 by specifying avenues for future research on political behavior and security, and beyond the temporal and geographic scope examined here. The book closes by touching on the policy implications for practitioners aiming to prevent atrocities and to promote peace, liberalism, and human rights after violence. It highlights how interventions aimed at buttressing the balance of power, reducing the urgency of security issues, bolstering nonbelligerent parties, and countering historical distortion may speed up the normalization of politics, dampening the perverse electoral potency of war outcomes, and amplifying opportunities for justice and democracy after war.

## I N D E X

Page numbers in *italics* indicate figures and tables.

- ABC News, 200
- advertising campaign, 289n115
- Agencia Nacional de Seguridad Salvadoreña, 115
- agenda manipulation, 54
- Alape, Pastor, on mitigation of violence by FARC, 97, 98
- Alejos, Sebastián, FMLN campaign manager, 121, 137, 141
- Allison, Michael, 309n225
- amnesty, 160, 191, 244, 245, 246, 293n6
- anarchy, 17, 33; civil war and, 285n46; Colombian campaign and, 95, 96; end of, 261; Guatemalan campaign and, 173; strongman justification and, 258
- anger, 294n22
- Angola: subnational wartime victimization, 227, 228; violence, war outcomes and postwar elections, 271
- ANN. *See* New Nation Alliance (ANN)
- Anti-Sandinistas Popular Militia, 197
- Árbenz, Jacobo, reforms in Guatemala, 159
- Arévalo, Juan José, reforms in Guatemala, 159
- ARENA party, 1, 115, 277n8; advertisements, 124, 125, 126, 133, 133, 134, 136; campaign plan, 129; campaign strategy, 122–35; candidates, 130–31; determinants of vote choice (1999), 150; internal groupings, 305n117; issue priming, 129; maps of FMLN violence, 135; messaging objectives, 123; partisan ownership of security, 149–50, 153; popular support, 148; positional strategy, 127; presidential slogans, 130; programmatic strategy, 122; security as valence strategy, 122–27; signing of peace accords, 124, 126; slogan, 122, 307n171; targeting moderate voters, 128–29; undermining FMLN’s ownership of security valence issue, 131–35; winning security, swing and victimized vote, 145–47; winning some victims votes, 147–48
- armed conflicts, threat of violence in, 11
- attribution error theory, 288n100
- Baldizón Méndez, Manuel Antonio, 192
- ballot, secret versus open, 104, 105
- Bangladesh, 227, 230, 271
- Baum, Matthew, on public opinion toward use of force, 10
- Believers, unconditional party loyalty and mobilization, 38
- belligerent parties: burnishing their security credentials, 33–34; civil war and, 285n46; claim of Restrained Leviathan, 28–37; definition of, 18, 213; example of offsetting the violent past, 31–32; laundering their reputations, 28–33; leadership selection, 39; model of reference-dependent preferences on past atrocity, 29–30; political persuasion and communication, 44–45; predictors of performance, 13;



- belligerent parties (*continued*)  
programs and positional politics, 37–38;  
propaganda of, 285n45; signaling  
restraint from future victimization,  
34–36; successors, over time, 52–54;  
successor parties and, 13–14; valence  
advantages, 36–37
- belligerent-tied politicians, influence on  
public safety and social services, 246–51
- Berger, Óscar: PAN's candidate, 167; on  
security issue, 166
- Berinsky, Adam, on public opinion toward  
use of force, 10
- Berlin Wall, 117
- Bianchi, Francisco, 313n41
- Bicesse Accords, 241
- Black Lives Matter, 329n22
- bloodstained parties: elections of, 14;  
electoral successes of, 1–3
- Boix, Carles, on electoral institutions, 20
- Bolsonaro, Jair, Brazil, 257
- Brancati, Dawn, on belligerents accepting  
election results, 5
- Brazil, Bolsonaro of, 257
- Buhari, Muhammadu, Nigeria, 257
- Burundi, ethnic war, 234–35
- Bush, Sarah, on election violence, 278n41
- Bustamante, Enrique Borgo, 130
- Bustillo, Juan Rafael, war criminal, 154
- Cabal, María Fernanda, Uribista senator, 95
- Calderón Sol, Armando, 130
- campaign information, TV coverage,  
295n49
- Carpio, Ramiro de León, 375
- Castro, Vanessa, on mixed middle voters in  
Nicaragua, 199
- Catholics, 182
- CDN. *See* Democratic Coordinating  
Committee (CDN)
- CEH. *See* Comisión para el Escalareci-  
miento Histórico (CEH)
- Central America: party strategy in, 110–14;  
war outcomes in, 12–13
- Centro Democrático (CD), 100; as electoral  
vehicle, 94; fear of war recurrence and  
votes for, 106; Uribista party, 94–96
- Chamorro, Violeta, UNO leader, 200
- Chapultepec Accords, 117
- Christian Democratic Party (PDC),  
Duarte, 116, 119–20
- Christian Democrats, 156, 174, 175
- Civil Self-Defense Patrols (PACs), Ríos  
Montt and, 160
- Civil War, General Grant and US, 34
- Civil War Successor Party (CWSP), 13, 14,  
16, 61, 212; correlates of, success around  
the world, 219, 220–21, 269; cross-national  
cases, 229; dataset, 237–39; frequency of  
war outcomes in dataset, 217; postwar  
elections, 242; summary statistics of  
dataset, 268
- clientelism: ARENA and FMLN and, 153;  
voting determinant, 101, 102, 103; war  
outcome and, 237, 238
- Close, David, on Sandinistas' victor  
advantage, 202
- coercion: Colombia, 103–6; El Salvador,  
150–51; Guatemala, 187–88; Nicaragua, 197
- Cohen, Herman, on UNITA, 242
- Cold War, 114, 117, 281n5
- Colom, Álvaro, 191; on URNG party, 177, 178
- Colombia, 49, 59; determinants of vote  
choice, 101–3; elections (2018), 12;  
experimental design of rebel and govern-  
ment belligerent party strategies, 79–80;  
fieldwork in, 12; governance records of  
paramilitary mayors, 247–48, 249, 250–51;  
hypotheses of government armed forces  
in experiment as winning belligerent, 82;  
manifesto of nonbelligerent party in, 27;  
mitigation experiment, 70–74; narratives  
experiment, 74–78; National Planning  
Department, 66; peace process in, 59;  
probability of being elected for govern-  
ment belligerent candidate, 87; probabili-  
ty of being preferred on security for  
government belligerent candidates, 84, 85;

- sampling strategy, 67; subnational wartime victimization, 226, 227; survey, 64, 65–67; survey experiments, 68–70; survey of victims and nonvictims, 12, 68; victim status, 293n7; violence, war outcomes and postwar elections, 271
- Colombia Humana, 91; Petro of, 98–99; voting determinants, 102
- Colombian Center for Historical Memory, 107
- Colombian Federation of Victims of the FARC (FEVCOL), 89
- Colombian National Comptroller's Victim Survey, 67
- Colombian Supreme Court, 246, 328n18
- Colombia's 2018 elections, 90–100; coercion in, 103–6; equilibrium versus nonequilibrium party strategies and performance in, 99–100; Fajardo as Rule Abider, 91; FARC strategy of abuse-mitigating Radicalism, 91, 92, 97–98; ignorance and fog of war, 106–8; information and judgments about atrocities, 108; parties' strategies and electoral implications, 92; party system, 91, 108–9; Petro as Tactical Immoderate, 91, 92, 98–99; Santismo and Juan Manuel Santos, 90–91; Santismo strategy of Rule Abider, 91, 92, 92–94; Uribismo and Álvaro Uribe, 90–91; Uribismo strategy of Restrained Leviathan, 91, 92, 94–96; voting determinants, 101, 102, 103
- Comisión para el Escalarecimiento Histórico (CEH), 160
- Common Alternative Revolutionary Force (FARC), 98. *See* FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
- communication, political persuasion and, 44–45
- Communist Party, 115; Cuban Revolution and, 114
- conflict: affected populations, 66; justifications for, 74, 75; understandings of, 88–89
- Consultoría Interdisciplinaria en Desarrollo S.A., 121, 164, 302n10
- Contra War, 197, 198, 205–6, 207, 208
- core voter model, 287n81
- Corstange, Daniel, Syria, 300n146
- Couto, Mia, terror and democratic elections, 103
- COVID-19 global pandemic, 70
- crimes against humanity, 298n109
- Cristiani, Alfredo: ARENA candidate, 305n122, 306n137; ARENA president, 124, 128, 131, 134; ARENA party, 153; on peace, 143, 144; on power balance, 310n235; on security, 145–47
- Croatia: ethnic war, 235–36; HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) party, 236, 327n80; Homeland War, 236, 327n82
- Cuadra, Joaquín, Sandinista network, 204
- Cuba, 115; Communist Party, 114
- CWSP. *See* Civil War Successor Party (CWSP)
- Dada, Héctor, on ARENA and FMLN platforms, 138
- D'Aubuisson, Roberto: ARENA's founder, 120–21, 127, 154–55; party leadership, 130; U.S. Embassy on, 124
- death squad, 115, 116; alliance, 115; FMLN referring to ARENA as members of, 141; networks of, 1, 120
- de la Calle, Humberto: campaign of, 99–100; security plan of, 93–94; voting determinants for, 102
- democracy: characterization of, 19; democratic transitions, 279n53; founding election influencing postwar, 6–7, 61, 244–45, 246
- Democratic Convergence, 120
- Democratic Coordinating Committee (CDN), election fairness, 198
- democratic elections, 19–20
- Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 286n51
- Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, 197

- demonstration elections, wartime, 20
- Dix, Robert, on civil conflict in Colombia, 233
- Domínguez-Trujillo, Ramfis, dictator's grandson, 257
- dominance principle, 172, 314n86
- Dominican Republic, Trujillo of, 257
- Downes, Alexander, on public reaction to civilian targeting in war, 10
- Duarte, José Napoleón, Christian Democratic Party (PDC), 116, 119–20
- Duque, Iván: appointments of conflict-deniers by, 297n77; election win (2018), 70; on security, 95; in 2018, untouched by scandal, 96; voting determinants, 102
- Duterte, Rodrigo, Philippines, 257
- economic: voting and, 10; voting determinants, 101, 102, 103
- education: non-paramilitary and paramilitary politicians and, 248; paramilitary politician win on, 251; public goods outcomes and spending, 249
- Eguía, Jon: on disadvantaged party, 41; on tactical extremism, 42
- Eichenberg, Richard, on public opinion toward use of force, 10
- El Diario de Hoy* (newspaper), 121, 133, 135
- election(s): advancing justice, 260–61; democratic, 19–20; founding results influencing postwar justice and democracy, 244–45, 246; fundamentals of, 10; helping keep the peace, 259–60; postwar, 271–72; wars and, 24; World Values Survey, 273. *See also* Colombia's 2018 elections; El Salvador; Guatemala; Nicaragua
- electoral incumbency, controlling state apparatus and media, 44–45
- electoral institutions, 20–21
- Electoral Law of 1984, Nicaragua, 198
- electoral outcomes: alternative explanations for, 48–51; in cleaner and less clean elections, 224; correlates of success, 269; following ethnic vs. nonethnic conflicts, 232; intimidation of voters, 49; organizational strength, 51; parties playing the wrong hand, 46–48; peace or war recurrence and, 52; political preferences and, 50; postwar, 55–56; power upsets, and remilitarization, 242–43; subnational data on, 271–72; with clientelistic and programmatic linkages, 238; war outcomes and, 15, 26, 55–56, 258
- electoral success, 22; of bloodstained parties, 1–3; of violent victors, 5
- electoral system: actors designing, 20; analysis of, 219; in El Salvador, 118, 121–22, 132, 146–48, 156; Guatemala, 158, 162–64, 183, 188, 193; Latin America, 56; median voter theorem and, 286n68; Nicaragua, 195, 197, 199–201; political power sharing and, 215; two-round, 323n13
- electoral targeting, prioritizing swing voters, 38–39
- ELN. *See* National Liberation Army (ELN)
- El Nuevo Diario* (newspaper), 200
- El Salvador, 57, 155–57; alternative explanations, 148–51; ARENA's strategy to campaign, 122–35; balance of atrocities, 116–17; characterizing the voters, 118; Christian Democratic Party (PDC), 119–20; civil war belligerent successor parties, 120–21; civil war of, 114–21; credit for peace, 143–44; data sources, 121; determinants of vote choice (1994), 150; FMLN's strategy to campaign, 135–41; justice, crime and security brand, 152–53; mass violence in, 155–56; media and persuasion, 142–43; military draw, 13, 110; National Conciliation Party (PCN), 115, 154–55; nonbelligerent party, 119–20; party system, 153; peace, 151–52; popular support, 148; postwar democratic elections, 118; subnational war outcome, 228; subnational wartime victimization, 226, 227; violence, war outcomes and postwar elections, 271; voters, 143–48;

- voters' understanding of war outcome, 117; wartime violence, 144–45; winning security, swing and victimized vote, 145–47; winning some victims votes, 147–48
- endogeneity, 218–19; endogeneity problem, 24; spuriousness and, 218–19
- Escobar, Roberto, PCN party, 154
- ethnic wars, 231–37; Burundi, 234–35; Croatia, 235–36; East Timor, 236, Iraq, 235; Kosovo, 327n83; Namibia, 236–37; Rwanda, 233–34; Sri Lanka, 236; war outcomes and vote shares, 232
- Fajardo, Sergio: Colombian election, 91, 100; strategy of abuse-punishing Rule Abider, 91
- false positives, 64, 88, 292n4
- Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), 115, 117, 213; ARENA undermining FMLN's security issue ownership, 131–35; campaign strategy, 135–41; candidates, 140–41; cartoon campaign ads, 138; constituent organizations of, 306n161; determinants of vote choice (1994), 150; factionalization of, 307n175, 307–8n180; owning the security valence issue, 136–37, 153; partisan ownership of security, 149–50; popular support of, 148; positional strategy, 137–39; slogan “First, the People”, 139, 140; targeting the moderate voter, 139–40; valence strategy, 136; winning security, swing and victimized vote, 146–47; winning some victims votes, 147
- FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), 68–69; Colombian Federation of Victims of the FARC (FEVCOL), 89; combat boots, 81; Common Alternative Revolutionary Force (FARC) party, 65, 293n6; experimental design of rebel belligerent party strategies, 80; hypotheses of experiment as losing belligerent, 82; mitigation and contrition narratives, 77; peace process with, 65, 293, n5; political campaign, 88; probability of being elected, 87; rebels, 1, 24, 59; security improvements, 294n24; strategy as abuse-mitigating Radicalism, 91, 92, 97–98; war violence 107–8; war outcome between Colombian government and, 68–69
- Farjardo, Sergio, voting determinants, 102
- Fearon, James, on bargaining and war recurrence, 279n47
- Feaver, Peter, on public opinion toward use of force, 10
- Federalist No. 51* (Madison), 28, 169, 278n26
- FEVCOL. *See* Colombian Federation of Victims of the FARC (FEVCOL)
- Finnemore, Martha, on logic of appropriateness and justice, 7
- Flores, Thomas, on democratic elections after conflict, 7
- FMLN. *See* Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)
- fog of war, 2–3; ignorance about atrocities and, 106–8
- Fortna, Virginia Page, on postwar democratization, 6
- founding elections, 22
- FRELETIN (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), 236, 327n84
- FRG. *See* Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG)
- FRUD (Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy), 323n11; Djibouti, 213
- FSLN. *See* Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)
- Fujimori, Alberto, legacy of, 257, 292n174
- Fujimori, Keiko, Peru, 257
- Galindo, David Escobar, Salvadoran government peace negotiator, 117
- García-Sánchez, Miguel, attitudes about military, 105
- Garrard-Burnett, Virginia: on URNG threat in 1982, 159; on victimized vote, 179
- Gelpi, Christopher, on public opinion toward use of force, 10
- genocide, Rwanda 1994, 233–34

- Giovanoni, Francesco: on disadvantaged party, 41; tactical extremism, 42
- Godoy, Virgilio, PLI candidate, 204, 320n41
- Goebertus, Juanita: on arrogance of FARC, 97; on postwar party and voter strategies, 64
- González, Remigio Ángel, media and FRG, 178
- Gordillo Martínez, Luís, 313n41
- governance, impact of elections on, 8–9, 61–62
- government belligerent successor party, definition of, 18, 213
- government victory, 23
- Granados, Héctor Rosada, peace negotiator, 181
- Grant, Ulysses S.: Civil War and presidential candidate, 34; *Harper's Weekly* ad, 35; military service of, 286n57
- Greene, Kenneth, on birth defects of party's origins, 47
- Green Party, manifesto of, in Colombia, 27
- Groeling, Tim, on public opinion toward use of force, 10
- Grzymala-Busse, Anna, on successor parties and contrition, 289n10
- Guardado, Facundo: on peace, 143; rewriting of history of war, 124
- Guatemala, 13, 57, 156, 157; balance of atrocities, 160–61; blame for wartime violence, 180; characterizing the voters, 162–63; civil war belligerent successor parties, 163–64; coercion, 187–88; credit for peace, 179–80; data sources, 164; determinants of vote choice, 189; FRG (Guatemalan Republican Front), 163–64; FRG postwar vote share and voter ideology, 184; FRG's party strategy, 167–76; government violence and FRG vote share, 183; government relative victory, 110, 158–59; ideology and economic voting, 188–90; incumbency, 186–87; media and persuasion, 178–79; National Advancement Party (PAN), 163; organizational assets, 187; PAN's party strategy, 165–67; partisan issue ownership, 186; party system, 192; popular support, 185; postwar democratic elections, 161–62; preference for belligerent's security, 180–81; security issue and, 149; subnational wartime victimization, 226, 227; URNG's party strategy, 176–78; violence, war outcomes and postwar elections, 271; voters, 179–85; war outcomes, 161; war setting the stage, 159–64; wartime government atrocities, 184; winning security, swing and victimized votes, 181–83; winning some victims' votes, 183–85. *See also* Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG); Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)
- Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (URNG), 159; candidates, 178; positional strategy, 176–77; targeting immoderate voter, 177–78; valence strategy, 176–77; war outcomes, 161. *See also* Guatemala
- Guatemalan News and Information Bureau Archive, 164
- Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), 1; candidates, 174–76; claiming competence on security, 168–69; determinants of vote choice, 189; FRG vs. PAN's security programs, 170–72; hand coding of security platforms, 172; issue ownership, 186; issue priming, 172–73; logo, 168; positional strategy, 173; public preference for strong-arm government, 317n168; targeting moderate voter, 174; valence strategy, 167–68; war violence as “the situation”, 315n125
- Guatemalan Tribunal Supremo Electoral, 183
- Guatemalism, FRG's version of nationalism, 174
- Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) rebels, 175
- guerrilla violence: terrorism, 282n9. *See also* FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)

- Guido, Clemente, PCDN candidate, 204
- Gustavo, Petro, strategy as Tactical Immoderation, 91, 92, 98–99
- Hammond, Thomas, on campaign positioning, 54
- Handál, Shafik, on FMLN campaign, 139
- Harper's Weekly* (magazine), 34, 35
- Hartzell, Caroline, on quality of postwar democracy, 7, 244
- heresthetic, 26; definition, 284n7
- Hoddie, Matthew, on quality of postwar democracy, 7, 244
- Holland, Alisha, on partisan issue ownership in El Salvador, 149
- Homeland War, Croatia, 236, 327n82
- Honduras, Somoza National Guard members in, 197
- Howell, William, on use of international force, 9
- Huang, Reyko: on postwar democracy, 6; rebel public goods and financing variables, 218–19
- Human Rights Watch, 277n15, 292n4
- Humes, Brian, on campaign positioning, 54
- Humphreys, Macartan, on wartime violence, 324n27
- Huntington, Samuel: on principle of legal accountability in democracy, 27; on strong parties born of war, 52; on torturer problem, 8
- Hutu genocide, Rwanda, 233–34
- Hyde, Susan, on election monitors, 283n30
- ideology: as vote determinant, 50, 317n194; voting determinants, 101, 102, 103
- immoderation, explanations for, 288n103
- India, 258; subnational wartime victimization, 226, 227; violence, war outcomes and postwar elections, 271
- Indonesia, 231, 326n53; subnational wartime victimization, 227; violence, war outcomes and postwar elections, 271
- information and communications technology (ICT), 289n120
- Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica, 200
- Instituto Doxa, 200
- Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP), 121, 145, 302n10
- Integral System for Truth, Justice, Reparation, and no Repetition, 93
- International Criminal Court, 259
- International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 118
- International Organization for Migration (IOM), 277n17
- IRA, 24
- Iraq, ethnic war, 235
- issue priming, 54
- jail time for perpetrators, mitigation experiment, 74, 75
- Junta de Gobierno, 198
- Junta of National Reconstruction, 200
- justice: advancing, 260–61; El Salvador, 152–53; founding elections influencing postwar, 7–8, 244–45, 246; Guatemala, 191–92; impact of elections on, 61; Nicaragua 196; transitional, 289n109
- Justice Cascade, 252
- Just War Doctrine principle, 328n3
- Kagame, Paul, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), 234
- Kertzer, Joshua, on security and political behavior, 9
- Kuchuj Voz Ciudadana, Guatemala, 175, 315n123
- La Prensa* (newspaper), 200, 205
- La Prensa Gráfica* (newspaper), 121, 133
- Latin America, 49, case selection of, 56–57
- Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 100, 121, 144, 147, 151, 164, 181, 184, 188, 302n10
- Latin American Studies Association, 319n31

- Lau, Pedro Palma, guerrilla commander, 175
- law and order, 257, 258, 329n21; ARENA's, 123, 124, 146; FRG's, 168, 172, 174, 180; Uribismo's, 96, 266
- leadership, party elite and candidates, 39–40
- leadership valence, definition, 288n91
- LeBas, Adrienne, on us-them distinctions in conflict, 38
- lemmings, view of public as, 106
- Leviathan: Hobbes's term, 33, 35; strategy, 53
- Levitsky, Steven, on successor party cohesion, 39
- liberal democracy, 245
- liberation theory, 114
- Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 213, 236
- Liberia, 241; subnational wartime victimization, 227; violence, war outcomes and postwar elections, 272
- Lipset, Seymour, on electoral institutions, 20
- logic of consequences, justice, 8, 255
- logic of appropriateness, justice, 7–8
- Loxton, James, on El Salvador, 120–21, 154, on Guatemala, 165
- Lucas García, Benedicto, 179, 313n41; political platform, 185; repression under, 175; scorched earth strategy, 168
- Lucas García, Romeo, Guatemala, 159, 165
- Lupu, Noam, on definition of electoral success, 22
- Lyons, Terrence, on Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), 234
- Mainwaring, Scott, on successor parties, 329n1
- Magaloni, Beatriz, on electoral coercion, 278n22
- McCrary Test, regression discontinuity design, 276
- McDermott, Monika L., on impact of military backgrounds on voters, 34
- Madison, James: on design of government, 28, 278n26; on party's credibility, 34
- managerial competency, belligerent party claiming, 36–37
- Marcos, Ferdinand, Philippines, 257
- Martí, Farabundo, communist peasant uprising by, 114
- Matanock, Aila: attitudes about military, 105; on postwar democratic elections, 7
- Mayan holocaust, 160
- media, El Salvador, 142–43
- Medrano, José Alberto, “grandfather of the death squads”, 120
- Meléndez, Manuel: ARENA's campaign strategist, 121, 132; on Zamora as FMLN candidate, 141
- Menchú, Rigoberta, on Guatemalan elections, 162
- military balance of power, war and, 14
- military draw, 21, 23; ARENA and FMLN, 135, 141, 142; in campaigns following, 45; FARC and, 68, 81, 86; El Salvador, 13, 110. *See also* El Salvador
- military outcomes: continuum of, 23; public reactions, 10; terms, 23
- Misión Observatorio Electoral, 104, 300n143
- mitigation experiment: average treatment effects (ATEs), 72, 73, 74; heterogenous treatment effects, 74, 75; experimental set-up, 71–72
- model(s): core voter, 287n81; reference-dependent preferences on past atrocity, 29–30; spatial voting, 286n68; swing voter, 287n81
- Monsanto, Pablo, on Guatemalan elections, 162
- Movimiento de Acción Popular Marxista Leninista, 200, 321n69
- Mozambique, 287n78; subnational war outcome, 228; violence, war outcomes and postwar elections, 272
- Multinomial Naive Bayes, 113; algorithm, 301n7
- multipartyism, 21

- Nalepa, Monika, on logic of consequences and justice, 8
- Namibia, 323n13; ethnic war, 236–37
- narratives experiment, 74–78; military contrition, 76, 77; military mitigation, 76, 77; order effects of narratives, 77; rebel contrition, 76, 77; rebel mitigation, 76, 77
- Nast, Thomas, cartoon by, 286n57
- National Advancement Party (PAN), 161; determinants of vote choice, 189; FRG vs. PAN's security platforms, 170–72; Guatemala, 163; hand coding of security platforms, 172; party strategy, 165–67; positional strategy, 166; security issue, 165–66, 186; tangible policy proposals, 313n60; targeting moderate voter, 166–67; war outcomes, 161
- National Center for Historical Memory, 75, 94
- National Conciliation Party (PCN), 115, 128, 154–55
- National Conservative party, Somoza dynasty and, 195
- National Fund for Peace, 178
- National Liberation Army (ELN), 69
- National Revolutionary Movement, 120
- National Security Council, 200
- negative peace, 6, 252, 279n45
- Nepal: subnational war outcome, 228; subnational wartime victimization, 226; violence, war outcomes and postwar elections, 272
- New Nation Alliance (ANN), 164, 178
- Nicaragua, 13, 57, 156; backdrop of war and peace, 195–200; balance of atrocities, 195–96; belligerent successor and nonbelligerent parties, 199–200; campaigning to secure the future, 201–5; candidates, 204–5; characterizing voters, 199; data sources, 200; Electoral Law of 1984, 198; electoral targeting, 203–4; peace in, 207–9, 323n109; persuasion, 205; positional strategies, 203; postwar democratic elections, 196–99; rebel victory, 110, 194, 206–9; security issue and, 149; valence strategies, 201–2; voters, 205–6; war outcome, 196
- niche parties, 48, 290n132
- Nigeria, Buhari of, 257
- nonbelligerent parties, 282n19; claim as rule abider, 27–28; definition of, 213; description of, 19; El Salvador, 119–20; forgive and forget strategy, 290n131; leadership selection, 39–40; National Advancement Party (PAN), 163; political persuasion and communication, 44–45; programs and positional politics, 37–38; rule of law and, 260
- Nooruddin, Irfan, on democratic elections after conflict, 7
- observational survey data, 88–90
- Organization of American States, 162, 187–88
- Ortega, Daniel: depiction as “man of peace”, 321n77; FSLN candidate, 204; Sandinista commander, 201
- PACs. *See* Civil Self-Defense Patrols (PACs)
- PAN. *See* National Advancement Party (PAN)
- Panagopoulos, Costas, on impact of military backgrounds on voters, 34
- Panbianco, Angelo, on believers, 38
- paramilitaries: atrocities of, 2; governance records of mayors, 247–48, 250–51; offsetting violent past of, 31–32; scandal of politics and, 298n92
- Partido Comunista de Nicaragua, 200
- Partido Conservador Demócrata de Nicaragua (PCDN), 199–200, 202
- Partido Liberal Independiente (PLI), 321n58; Nicaragua, 199–200, 202
- Partido Liberal Nacionalista (PLN), Somoza's, 199
- Partido Popular Social Cristiano, Nicaragua, 199–200
- Partido Republicano Institucional (PRI), 318n210



- Partido Socialista Nicaragüense, 200
- parties: combinations of strategy on  
perceived competence on security, 265;  
issue ownership, 26; niche, 48; Party  
Manifiesto Project variables, 267; playing  
the wrong hand, 46–48; political persua-  
sion and communication, 44–45; repu-  
tation of, 26; strategies in Central  
America, 110–14; strategies of, 56–58;  
war influencing, 11–12
- Party Manifiesto Project (PMP), 113, 139, 173,  
177, 203, 301n6; variables, 267
- party system, 21; definition, 279n52
- PCDN. *See* Partido Conservador Demócrata  
de Nicaragua (PCDN)
- PCN. *See* National Conciliation Party (PCN)
- PDC. *See* Christian Democratic Party (PDC)
- peace: assessing risk of war recurrence,  
243–44; cases of postconflict war and,  
244; El Salvador, 151–52; Guatemala,  
190–91; helping elections keep, 259–60;  
Nicaragua, 207–9; process in Colombia, 59
- Peace Accords, 312n24
- Peace Agreement Dataset, *shagov* variable, 214
- peace and prosperity, fundamental drivers  
of elections, 10
- peace-versus-justice debate, voters on, 7–8
- Pedraz, Santiago, 191
- Pérez Molina, Otto, 191, 192
- Peru, 257; subnational wartime victimiza-  
tion, 227; violence, war outcomes and  
postwar elections, 272
- Peters, Johanna: on Fajardo and Duque,  
297n73; on Uribe, 298n92
- Petro, Gustavo: Colombia Humana move-  
ment, 91; strategy and electoral implica-  
tions, 92; as successful Tactical  
Immoderate, 92, 98–99
- Pevhouse, Jon, on use of international  
force, 9
- Philippines: Duterte of, 257; Marcos of, 257;  
subnational wartime victimization, 227;  
violence, war outcomes and postwar  
elections, 272
- piloting of survey, 300n147
- Plan Colombia, President Uribe and,  
68–69
- PLI. *See* Partido Liberal Independiente (PLI)
- PLN. *See* Partido Liberal Nacionalista (PLN)
- political behavior, security and, 9–10, 14,  
255–56
- political life after war: belligerent successor  
and nonbelligerent parties, 213; correlates  
of CWSP success around the world, 219,  
220–21; cross-national data, 222–25;  
electoral coercion, 217–18, 224–25;  
electoral performance in cleaner and less  
clean elections, 224; ethnic wars, 231–37;  
global tracing of, 212–25; government  
belligerent vote shares, 223; patronage  
politics, 237; postwar election results,  
214; rebel vote shares, 222; security  
voting, 229, 230, 231; selection and bias,  
214–15; subnational data around the  
world, 225–28; war outcomes, 215–16,  
217, 222, 223, 224; wartime violence,  
216–17, 225
- Political Parties of the Americas, 146
- political party, definition of, 18
- political persuasion, communication and,  
44–45
- politics, valence, 25–27
- popular support, definition of, 24
- Popular Social Christian Movement, 120
- Portillo, Alfonso, 175; security credentials,  
315n113
- positional strategies, Nicaragua, 203
- positional strategy: ARENA party, 127;  
FMLN, 137–39; FRG, 173; FSLN, 203;  
PCDN, 203; PAN, 166; URNG, 176–77
- positive peace, 279n45
- postwar concerns, voters, 16–18
- postwar elections: correlates of remilitariza-  
tion after, 274–75; sources of selection,  
21–22; subnational data on, 271–72
- postwar political order, founding of, 283n30
- postwar politics: electoral success, 22;  
founding elections, 22

- power balance, 291n148, 291n151; peace or war recurrence, 52
- power of media, persuading voters, 4
- Power-Sharing Event Dataset, 215
- Prada, Alfonso, Santos's campaign, 99–100
- Prather, Lauren, on election violence, 278n41
- Press, Daryl, on public opinion toward use of force, 10
- Prevost, Gary, on mixed middle voters in Nicaragua, 199
- Princeton University archives, 164
- programmatically versus clientelistic politics, 237, 238
- proportional representation (PR), 21
- Protestants, 182
- Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica (REMHI), 160
- public goods, outcomes and spending, 249
- public safety, elections of belligerent-tied politicians on, 246–51
- Radicalism, FARC strategy, 91, 92, 97–98
- Rajapaksa, Gotabaya, Sri Lanka, 257
- Ramírez, Sandra: on success of belligerent party, 63; on violence of FARC, 97
- Ramírez Mercado, Sergio, Ortega's running mate, 205
- rebel: definition, 18; movements, 282n19; violence, 107, 108
- rebel successor party, formation of, 18–19
- rebel victory, 23
- regression discontinuity (RD): design, 62, 246; McCrary Test, 276; public goods outcomes and spending, 249; security outcomes, 249; validating the design, 276
- Reifler, Jason, on public opinion toward use of force, 10
- relative government victory, 23
- REMHI. *See* Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica (REMHI)
- research design: democracy impact, 61; equilibrium party strategies after large-scale violence in war, 57; governance impact, 61–62; justice impact, 61; party strategies, 56–58; voter strategies, 58–60; war and peace impact, 60; war outcomes and postwar election results, 55–56. *See also* 54–62
- Restrained Leviathan, 4, 12, 44, 47, 62, 261; attracting votes for military winner, 63; belligerent party as, 35; belligerent party's claim to security, 28–37, 90; strategy of, 40, 56, 57, 59, 60; Uribe's strategy in Colombia, 91, 92, 94–96; violent victors running as, 254; voters and, 45–46
- Restrained Leviathan vs. Tactical Immoderate experiment, 78–88; average marginal component effect (AMCE), 82–83; experimental design of government belligerent party strategies, 79; experimental design of rebel belligerent party strategies, 80; probability candidate considered competent on security, 85; probability of assigning credit for ending conflict, 86; probability of being elected (government belligerent candidates), 87; probability of being perceived competent on security, 83; winning belligerent (government armed forces), 82
- Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, 98. *See also* FARC and Common Alternative Revolutionary Force
- Revolutionary Governing Junta, 115
- riding the wave logic, 172, 314n87
- Riker, William: heresthetic, 284n7; rhetoric of political persuasion, 44
- Ríos Montt, Efraín, 160; credit for peace, 179–80; FRG on security, 168–69, 180–81; FRG's manifesto, 168; FRG's strongman, 174–76, 314n80; Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), 1, 163–64; guilty of genocide, 312n16
- robberies, security outcomes, 249
- robustness checks, correlates of CWSP success, 269
- Rokkan, Stein, on electoral institutions, 20
- Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, on support for democracy, 7

- Rule Abider(s), 44, 47, 62; nonbelligerent party's claim, 27–28; nonbelligerent party strategy, 45, 46; PAN in Guatemala, 167; PDC in El Salvador, 119–20; Santismo strategy in Colombia, 91, 92, 92–94; strategy, 56, 57, 59
- rule of law, 240, 242, 257, 327n8
- Russia: subnational wartime victimization, 227; violence, war outcomes and postwar elections, 272
- Rwanda, ethnic war in, 233–34
- Sagan, Scott, on public opinion toward use of force, 10
- Salvadoran National Museum of Anthropology, 121
- Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN): election fairness and, 198; electoral targeting of, 203–4; undermining legacy of Somoza on security, 321n59; party manifesto, 320n56; valence strategy, 201–2; positional strategy, 203; rebels and Somoza regime, 194; Sandino, Augusto and, 195; tendencies within, 321n61; valence strategy, 201–2; victory of, 199; “War of Liberation”, 196; war outcome, 196
- Sandinista-Somoza war, 201
- Sandino, Augusto, murder of, 195
- Sandoval, Mauricio, on ARENA party, 304n85
- Santismo: claim to mantle of belligerent party, 103; Rule of Law, 266; Santos, Juan Manuel, 90–91; strategy of contrite Rule Abider, 91, 92, 92–94; voting determinants, 102
- Santos, Juan Manuel, 90–91; de la Calle and Vargas Lleras, 296–97n67; media advantage, 299n125
- Saunders, Elizabeth, on elite cues and public opinion toward use of force, 10
- Savimbi, Jonas, UNITA rebel leader, 241, 242
- security: ARENA undermining FMLN's ownership of valence issue, 131–35; attribution of blame and, 280n66; belligerent-tied politicians influence public safety, 246–51; combinations of party strategy on perceived competence, 265; Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 286n51; FMLN owning valence issue, 136–37; governance records of paramilitary mayors, 247–48, 250–51; Guatemala's FRG vs. PAN programs, 170–72; hand coding of platforms, 266; non-paramilitary and paramilitary politicians, 248; paramilitary politician win and theft, 250; political behavior and, 9–10, 14, 255–56; in positional politics, 37–38; proportion of voters around the world, 230; as valence issue, 25–26; voting, 10–11
- security voters, respondents as, 295n38
- security voting, 229, 231; marginal effect of, 230; proportion of, around world, 230; World Values Survey (WVS), 229
- Sikkink, Kathryn, on logic of appropriateness and justice, 7
- Snyder, Jack: on belligerents accepting election results, 5; on logic of consequences and justice, 8
- social desirability bias, 88
- social services, effect of elections of belligerent-tied politicians on, 246–51
- Somers, Margaret, on social narratives, 261
- Somoza, Anastasio: dictatorship, 201; dynasty of, 195; overthrow of dictatorship, 196; Partido Liberal Nacionalista (PLN), 199; Somoza regime and Sandinista rebels, 194; sons Luis and Anastasio, 195
- Somoza National Guard, 197
- South Africa: subnational wartime victimization, 226, 227; violence, war outcomes and postwar elections, 272
- Soviet Union, 114, 115
- spatial voting models, 286n68

- Sri Lanka, 272, 323n13; ethnic war, 236;  
Rajapaksa of, 257; subnational wartime  
victimization, 226, 227
- Stephens, Evelyn Huber, on support for  
democracy, 7
- Stephens, John, on support for democracy, 7
- Stoll, David, 179; on Guatemala, 179, 180
- strategic entry, party system, 21
- strategic voting, party system, 21
- subnational data: from around the world,  
225–28; violence, war outcomes and  
voting, 13–14; war outcomes and belliger-  
ent successor party vote share, 228;  
wartime victimization by government  
and postwar government successor party,  
227; wartime victimization by rebels and  
postwar rebel successor party, 226
- subnational paramilitary war outcomes,  
285n41
- subnational violence, war outcomes, and  
elections, data sources, 271–72
- subnational war outcomes, 225–28
- successor parties, belligerents and atrocities,  
13–14
- survey experiments: assessments of security  
competence, 89–90; Colombia, 68–70;  
descriptive statistics of sample, 263–64;  
mitigation experiment, 70–74; narratives  
experiment, 74–78; *Restrained Leviathan*  
vs. *Tactical Immoderate* experiment,  
78–88. *See also* *Restrained Leviathan*  
vs. *Tactical Immoderate* experiment
- SWAPO (South West Africa People's  
Organisation), 236, 327n84
- swing voter: concept of, 295n37; electoral  
targeting, 38–39; model, 287n81
- Syria, Corstange's methodology of sensitive  
questioning and, 300n146
- Tactical Immoderate*, 12, 44, 47, 62; attracting  
votes for military loser, 63; elite and  
candidate selection, 43–44; losing  
belligerent (FARC rebels), 82; probabil-  
ity of being elected (rebel belligerent  
candidates), 87; rationale of, 42; strategy,  
56, 57, 59, 60, 90; strategy of Gustavo Petro  
in Colombia, 91, 92, 98–99; URNG party,  
183; valence and position of platform,  
41–43; war-loser party, 40–44; *See also*  
*Restrained Leviathan* vs. *Tactical*  
*Immoderate* experiment
- Tactical Immoderation*, strategy of contri-  
tion, 97
- Tamil National Alliance (TNA), 213, 236
- Taylor, Charles, NPFL warlord, 241
- Teigen, Jeremy M., on evaluating candidates  
with military backgrounds, 34
- terrorism, guerrilla, 282n9
- thefts: non-paramilitary and paramilitary  
politicians' governance record on, 248;  
paramilitary politician win and, 250;  
security outcomes, 249
- Tilly, Charles, on uncommitted middle, 17
- Tomz, Mike, on security and political  
behavior, 9
- torturer problem, 8, 259
- Trujillo, Rafael, Dominican Republic,  
257
- Trump, Donald, 329n22
- Truth Commission, on wartime violence,  
144, 145
- Tutsi violence, Rwanda, 233–34
- Ubico, Jorge, 159; Guatemala's administra-  
tion, 159
- UCDP. *See* Uppsala Conflict Data Program  
(UCDP)
- UN Commission on the Truth, El Salvador,  
116, 147
- United Kingdom, 226, 227, 272
- United People's Freedom Alliance, 236
- United States, 114; support of National  
Conservative party, 195
- United States Information Agency (USIA),  
121
- University of North Texas, 309n225
- UNO: composition of, 322n97; U.S.-backed  
opposition party, 208–9

- Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 15;  
Armed Conflicts Database, 15; estimates of violence, 325n46; Conflict Encyclopedia, 212; Conflict Termination Dataset, 16, 212; definitions, 281n1; Georeferenced Event Database Global version 18.1, 225; One-Sided Violence Dataset, 324n25
- Urcuyo Maliaños, Francisco, 196
- Uribe, Álvaro, 90–91; investigations of, 2; Plan Colombia and, 68–69
- Uribismo: claiming mantle of belligerent party, 103; Law and Order, 266; strategy of Restrained Leviathan, 94–96; Uribe, Álvaro and, 90–91; voting determinants for, 101, 102
- URNG. *See* Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)
- U.S. Digital National Security Archives, 121, 200
- U.S. embassy cables, on electoral contests, 13
- valence: definition, 284n5; leadership, 288n91; politics, 25–27; security and economic issues, 84
- Valentino, Benjamin, on public opinion toward use of force, 10
- Vannini, Margarita: on election fairness, 197; on Casa de Chema Castillo raid, 318n3; on Somoza National Guard reorganization, 197; on UNO, 322n97
- Vargas Lleras, Germán: campaign of, 99–100; on patronage, 93; voting determinants, 102
- Varieties of Democracy, 215, 217, 237, 245; electoral performance in cleaner and less clean elections, 224
- Vélez, Juan Carlos, 95
- Victimization, heterogenous treatment effects, 74, 75
- victor's justice, 43
- Vinjamuri, Leslie, on logic of consequences and justice, 8
- violence: attributing blame, 284n19, 285n19; Colombia, 64; El Salvador, 116–17; Guatemala, 160–61, 191–92; mitigation experiment, 74, 75; Nicaragua, 195–96 phenomenon of violent actors, 13; Truth Commission on wartime, 144, 145; understandings of, 88–89; violent belligerents and voters, 4–5 violent victors: governance and, 8–9; theory, 63
- voter(s): coding, 295nn38–39; craving security, 4; democracy, 6–7; emerging from war, 16–18; Guatemalan, 162–63; justice, 7–8; model of reference-dependent preferences on past atrocity, 29–30; Nicaraguan, 199, 205–6; parties prioritizing swing, 38–39; party and, 11; reference point of violence-affected, 30; Salvadoran, 118, 143–48; security and political behavior, 9–10; security voting, 10–11; single-issue, 282n14; war and peace, 5–6; war influencing, 11–12; war outcome and party strategies, 45–46
- Voter Turnout Database, 324n39
- voting: determinants in Colombia's 2018 election, 101, 102, 103; determinants in El Salvador's 1994 election, 150; determinants in Guatemala's 1999 election, 188, 189; economic, 280–81n81; strategic, 283nn35–36
- Wantchekon, Leonard, on postwar democratic elections, 7
- war: assessing risk of recurrence, 243–44; cases of postconflict peace and, 244; credit for termination of, 253–54; ethnic wars, 231–37; influencing parties and voters, 11–12. *See also* political life after war
- war and peace, elections' impact on, 5–6, 60, 241–44
- war-loser party: elite and candidate selection, 43–44; rationale of tactical immoderation, 42; Tactical Immoderate, 40–44; valence and position of platform, 41–43

- war outcomes: belligerent successor party vote share and, 228; continuum of, 23, 215–16; correlates of CWSP success around world and, 220; explanations and endogeneity, 270; factors influencing, 23–24; frequency in CWSP dataset, 217; government belligerent vote shares in founding elections and, 223; influencing electoral success, 22–24; rebel vote shares in founding elections and, 222; subnational data on, 225, 228, municipal-level paramilitary, 285n41
- wartime victimization, subnational:  
government and postwar government successor party vote share, 227; rebels and post rebel successor party vote share, 226
- wartime violence: credit for ceasing, 3–5; cross-national analysis, 225; variables for, 216–17
- war-to-peace transition, 291n152
- Washington Post* (newspaper), 200
- Way, Lucan, on successor party cohesion, 39
- Weeks, Jessica, on security and political behavior, 9
- Weinstein, Jeremy, on wartime violence, 324n27
- Wood, Elisabeth Jean, 6; on democracy after war, 6; on Salvadoran elite, 154
- Wood, Reed, on popular support, 218
- World Politics* (journal), 303n49
- World Values Survey (WVS), 211; founding election dates, 273; security voting, 229
- Yarhi-Milo, Keren, on security and political behavior, 9
- Yashar, Deborah, on reform and homicide rates, 152, 191
- Zaller, John, on political framing, 10
- Zamora, Rubén: choice of, 307n177; FMLN candidate, 117, 118, 141; FMLN slogan, 140; on media, 143
- Zeitsoff, Thomas, on security and political behavior, 9